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INTRODUCTION
Should a claim, based in federal law and filed in state court, be
removable to federal court under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA)? The
answer to that seemingly simple question has not been clear.' For the last
ten years, various court opinions and academic articles have parsed the
plain meaning of SLUSA and the legislative intent surrounding the statute
and have come down on different sides of what is, at its core, a simple
issue.2 Different district courts have reached different conclusions, and
some district courts have even reached contrasting conclusions at different
times.3 This indecision regarding the proper forum for 1933 Act claims
initially filed in state court has created uncertainty for both plaintiffs and
business owners, who now cannot be sure which court will eventually
decide the claim at issue. Fortunately, in 2006, the Supreme Court handed
down an opinion that should answer the nagging removal question.4 Since
the Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust decision, several courts in different
federal jurisdictions have used the Supreme Court's language to cut
through the normative confusion and lay down the law as it currently
stands.5 It is the position of this Note that, in lieu of Kircher, claims based
solely in federal law and initially filed in state court are not removable
under the 1933 Act and its SLUSA amendment.
6
There are two ways that courts have interpreted the removal provision
of the 1933 Act. For the purposes of this Note, they will be referred to as
the "narrow interpretation" and the "broad interpretation." The narrow
interpretation holds that only claims based in state law, not claims based in
federal law, are removable to federal court.7 The broad interpretation holds
that claims based in either state or federal law are removable to federal
court under the 1933 Act.8 With only these two options, one woild not
think it strenuous for courts to definitively coalesce around a single
1. See Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 06-02931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at
*3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007) ("Although the question is straight-forward, the answer has
been anything but simple.").
2. See id.
3. See infra Part I.
4. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006).
5. See infra Parts III, IV.
6. See infra notes 14-21 for the language of SLUSA that is at issue.
7. See infra Part I.
8.Id.
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interpretation. In reality, finding a consensus has been much more
difficult.
For such a straightforward topic, SLUSA's removal question has given
rise to a fair amount of literature. Some articles deal not with which claims
should be removable, but with the related issue of whether a state or
federal appellate court should hear an appeal of a district court's remand
order following an attempted removal out of state court.9 Other articles
attempt to synthesize the current case law and statutory provisions to
create a workable and non-contradictory interpretation of the removal
provision. 10 Still other articles approach the removal question from a
mostly normative perspective. 1 Both William Synder and Jordan Costa
appear to have reached their respective conclusions about how the law
should be interpreted prior to their writing, and they both manage to get to
their own (directly opposing) conclusions by using essentially the same
group of facts. 12 The purpose of this Note is to take a step back from the
strong opinions that have permeated the discussion up to this point and
look at the direction in which the law is actually going, not the direction in
which some believe it should go. While the law may change, this present-
focused approach on the current state of the law will be more immediately
helpful to practitioners of securities law than more abstract, theoretical, or
speculative exercises.
9. See Thomas F. Lamprecht, Note, How Can It Be Wrong When It Feels So Right?
Appellate Review of Remand Orders Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act, 50 VILL. L. REV. 305, 338 (2005) (finding that SLUSA precludes appellate review of
remand orders, meaning that federal appellate courts are "not available to ensure
consistency and accuracy of the districts courts' application of SLUSA").
10. See Jeffery T. Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rights
of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 621 (2006) (suggesting
that amending SLUSA to permit removal of claims that are based in fraud under the 1933
Act would allow the 1933 Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), SLUSA, and the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 (CAFA) to work in harmony).
11. Compare William B. Snyder, Jr., Comment, The Securities Act of 1933 After
SLUSA: Federal Class Actions Belong in Federal Court, 85 N.C. L. REv. 669 (2007)
(interpreting the removal provision broadly so as to close any loopholes that Congress
may have inadvertently created, and dismissing Kircher while claiming that the statutory
language and legislative intent strongly support the author's broad reading of the statute),
with Jordan A. Costa, Note, Removal of Securities Act of 1933 Claims After SLUSA:
What Congress Changed, and What It Left Alone, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1193 (2004)
(interpreting the removal provision strictly and finding that the plain meaning and
legislative intent of the statute only allow for removal of state law claims).
12. See supra note 11.
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Unlike the works by Synder and Costa, this Note begins with no
preconceived notions about what the law should be. Rather, its purpose is
to determine the current state of the law. While this Note reaches the same
conclusion-that only state law claims are removable under SLUSA (the
narrow interpretation)-as Costa, it does so for different reasons.
Although Costa relies on the interpretative tools of plain meaning and
legislative intent, this Note explains that, especially in this case, they are
faulty and incomplete ways to arrive at the correct meaning of a statute.'
3
Instead, this Note will focus on the ebb and flow of recent judicial tides
from one interpretation to another, ending with what, this Note contends,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the law to be.
Part I of this Note will highlight the problem that courts around the
country have had interpreting the SLUSA amendment to the 1933 Act. It
will also identify the federal districts that have handed down conflicting
decisions, as well as districts that have issued internally inconsistent
opinions. Part II of this Note will illustrate why neither the plain meaning
doctrine, nor focusing on legislative intent, provides a clear and acceptable
answer to the removal question. Part III will evaluate the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Kircher and explain why this decision puts an end to the
interpretative controversy. Part IV will examine federal district courts that
have relied on Kircher to conclude that the narrow interpretation of
SLUSA is the correct one. Although some courts have failed to realize the
full implications of Kircher's holding, Part IV will analyze these
misguided decisions and show that at least one court that previously
favored the broad interpretation has cited the Kircher opinion in
overturning its own decision in favor of the narrow interpretation. This
movement is indicative of a slow shift in the judicial understanding of
proper removal procedure under SLUSA. This Note will show that despite
the pervasive confusion regarding the removal issue, the Supreme Court's
decision in Kircher is decisive on the matter, and a narrow interpretation
of SLUSA's removal provision is the correct one.
13. Costa, supra note 11, at 1213-14.
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I. LOWER COURTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REACH
AN INTERPRETATIVE CONSENSUS
A. The SLUSA Amendment to the Securities Act of 1933
To identify the removal problem, one must first go through a difficult
but necessary series of statutory gymnastics exercises. Before the SLUSA
amendment to the 1933 Act, the Act provided for concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction for all claims arising under the 1933 Act: "[N]o case
arising under [the 1933 Act] and brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States."' This
statute put plaintiffs in securities actions in the driver's seat of their
litigation. They could choose their preferred venue for the trial and remain
there. Defendant companies were forced to accept a plaintiff's choice of
venue and, consequently, the plaintiffs choice of law. By allowing
plaintiffs freedom over the choice of venue, Congress gave all plaintiffs a
commanding upper hand in any subsequent litigation.
After SLUSA was enacted in 1998, the original removal prohibition
remained largely intact; as a basic matter, all cases filed under the Act
were still non-removable, "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b)."' 5
Subsection (c) of SLUSA elaborates: "Removal of covered class actions.
Any covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered
security, as set forth in subsection (b) shall be removable to the Federal
district court for the district in which the action is pending, and shall be
subject to subsection (b).' 16 Therefore, any covered class action that meets
the requirements set out in subsection (b) became removable from state
court under SLUSA.
The basic definition of a covered security is not subject to dispute in
this context. 7 Nor is there confusion about the general meaning of a
covered class action. 18 However, the specific definition of the covered
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77u(a) (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2006)); see also
Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 06-02931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at *6 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 14, 2007).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(a) (2000). This Note will cite to the statutory provisions in the
United States Code, not the individual amendments of SLUSA.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(3) (2000) (providing a comprehensive definition).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2) (2000). This definitional section of SLUSA spells out quite
clearly the different ways that a class action becomes a covered class action. Important
factors include the number of persons or class members involved, whether there are
common questions of law or fact among the participants, the type of damages sought, and
2010]
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class actions mentioned in subsection (c)-the actions that are "set forth in
subsection (b)"' 9 and are now removable under the new SLUSA regime-
is in question. SLUSA's definitional section does not include an explicit
articulation of what types of claims must be alleged in a covered class
action for the action to be removable to federal court.2 °
This statutory labyrinthine journey ends at subsection (b), the only
section of SLUSA to attempt to define exactly what kinds of covered class
actions are newly removable: "Class action limitations. No covered class
action based upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision
thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private
party. .. ,,21 All courts that have tackled the removal question have had to
decide this ultimate issue: whether subsection (b)'s reference to covered
class actions based upon the statutory or common law of any state means
that only state law claims, and not federal law claims (specifically, claims
arising under the 1933 Act), are now removable under SLUSA. In other
words, does subsection (b) implicitly protect, by prohibiting their removal,
certain types of class actions that allege only causes of action arising out
of federal law from subsection (c)'s general grant of removal authority?
The question is complicated by the circumstances surrounding the
enactment of SLUSA. In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).2 Lawmakers took this action after
observing "ways in which the class action device was being used to injure
'the entire U.S. economy.', 23 These abuses usually took the form of
frivolous lawsuits, otherwise known as strike suits, filed not to correct a
wrong or recover on behalf of a group of aggrieved investors, but to make
quick money by causing a company, even one that may not have done
anything wrong, to settle theplaintiff's claim instead of wasting time and
24resources litigating the issue. As a solution to this problem, PSLRA was
whether the action is a derivative action. Id. If the drafters of SLUSA had been as explicit
with the definition of the "covered class actions," specifically referred to in subsection
(c), the confusion currently surrounding the issue could have easily been avoided.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f) (2000).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
22. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4.
23. Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at
31(1995)).
24. See id. (citing "nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious
discovery requests, and 'manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they
purportedly represent as clients' as problems with the current class action system)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995)).
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meant to dissuade frivolous lawsuits and greedy lawyers.25 PSLRA
imposed limits on recoverable damages and attorney's fees, mandated a
stay of discovery proceedings until any motions to dismiss had been
resolved, and required that all claims be stated with specificity and
particularity (often referred to as heightened pleading requirements).
While PSLRA changed the way that class action lawsuits would be
conducted at the federal level, it did not address those actions filed
initially in state court under the 1933 Act's concurrent jurisdiction
provision. 27 As a result, plaintiffs who wished to avoid the heightened
pleading requirements, and who may not have had enough information
prior to discovery to succeed on a motion to dismiss,28 took advantage of
the concurrent jurisdiction provision and filed their actions in state court.
The "litigation of class actions [in state courts] involving nationally traded
securities had previously [before PSLRA] been rare, 29 but after the
passage of PSLRA, state courts were flooded with class action lawsuits. It
was against this backdrop of plaintiffs flocking to state court to avoid
PSLRA requirements that Congress enacted SLUSA.3 °
B. Divergent Interpretations of the Current Law
1. The Narrow Interpretation-First and Seventh Circuits
Since the enactment of SLUSA, federal district courts have split on
whether the narrow interpretation or the broad interpretation of the
removal provision is correct. District courts in the First Circuit favor the
narrow interpretation. 31 After reviewing the statutory language and the
25. See id.
26. Id. at 81-82.
27. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
28. Often, a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs may suspect that something is wrong with
the way a company is conducting its business, but lack sufficient proof. Before PSLRA,
such a plaintiff could file a claim, immediately begin discovery proceedings, and
potentially find the evidence they needed to succeed on a claim. Targeted companies
contended that this immediate discovery opened the door to costly and malicious
harassment by plaintiffs looking for a quick settlement. With PSLRA's mandated stay of
discovery until a ruling on a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must have sufficient evidence
to defeat that motion in hand before filing a suit.
29. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82.
30. Id. ("To stem this 'shiflt] from Federal to State courts' and 'prevent certain State
private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the
objectives of the Reform Act.. .Congress enacted SLUSA.").
31. See In re Tyco Int'l Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.N.H. 2004).
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legislative history of SLUSA, the Tyco court concluded that neither
element supports the view that all cases under the 1933 Act should be
removable to federal court.32 Rather, the court found that SLUSA permits
only the removal of securities claims based in state law.33 The Tyco court
reached that conclusion two years before the Supreme Court spoke on the
issue in Kircher.
District courts in the Seventh Circuit also favor the narrow
interpretation. 34 Nauheim v. Interpublic Group was a case of first
impression for the court.35 In this action alleging solely federal claims of
material misrepresentations to shareholders in connection with the
defendant company's impending merger, the court denied the defendant's
motion for removal on the ground that the language of SLUSA clearly and
unambiguously permitted only the removal of state law claims.3 6 Like the
Tyco decision in the First Circuit, Nauheim was decided well before
Kircher.
2. The Broad Interpretation-Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits
Several other district courts favor the broad interpretation of SLUSA.
District courts in the Third Circuit appear to have adopted a pragmatic
response to the problem, attempting to do for Congress what they believe
Congress was unable to achieve through statute alone. 37 In Rovner v.
Vonage Holdings, the plaintiffs brought claims against the defendant
company based solely on the federal 1933 Act.38 In deciding that the case
properly belonged in federal court, the Rovner court stressed that a statute
should be read as a whole while looking at the context in which it was
32. Id. at 121-22.
33. Id.
34. See Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL 1888843
(N.D. I11. Apr. 16, 2003).
35. Id. at *4.
36. Id. ("Where, as here, the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, our inquiry
is complete.").
37. See, e.g., Pinto v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-0062, 2007 WL 1381746
(D.N.J. May 7, 2007) (relying solely on the reasoning of the Rovner court); Rovner v.
Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-178, 2007 WL 446658 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007).
38. Rovner, 2007 WL 446658, at *1 ("Because the Complaint raises allegations under
§§ 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act, and does not allege any state statutory or
common law violations, Plaintiff argues that the matter must be remanded to New York
State Court.").
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written.39 The court stressed that the purpose of SLUSA was to send all
the potentially problematic cases to the federal level, and found that the
influx of federally-based cases into state court "prevented the Act
[SLUSA] from fully achieving its objectives. 'AO Allowing plaintiffs to
litigate federal cases in state court was "irreconcilable with the
congressional findings.' al Rovner and Pinto v. Vonage Holdings were
both decided in 2007. Important to the focus of this Note is the fact that
neither decision mentions Kircher. The plaintiffs in these actions may
have concluded that the narrow interpretation was not a promising line of
argument, but subsequent cases have proven them wrong.
4 2
District courts in the Fourth Circuit have gone the way of the courts in
the Third Circuit and adopted a broad interpretation of SLUSA's removal
provision.43 The plaintiffs in Lowinger v. Johnston were a class of
stockholders who purchased shares in the defendant company while
relying on documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
that hid the company's looming losses. 44 The only claims at issue were
based on the 1933 Act.45 While acknowledging that the issue had not
previously arisen in the Fourth Circuit, the Lowinger court eschewed any
independent inquiry into the facts surrounding the enactment of SLUSA
and relied entirely on one case from the Second Circuit.46 The Second
Circuit jurisprudence on this issue has been murky at best,47 and the
opinion the Lowinger court cited did not contain a particularly robust
inquiry into the statute. It is therefore difficult to say exactly what factors
the court found most persuasive in considering the removal issue. Still,
whatever the reason, in this jurisdiction, solely 1933 Act claims are
removable under SLUSA.48
39. Id. at *4.
40. Id. at *5.
41. Id.
42. See infra Part IV.
43. See Lowinger v. Johnston, No. 05-316-H, 2005 WL 2592229 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 13,
2005).
44. Id. at *1-2.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *4 (quoting Cal. Pub. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86 (2d
Cir. 2004)).
47. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
48. It is also important to note that unlike the Third Circuit's decisions that avoided
Kircher, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Lowinger, and the cases that the Lowinger court
relied on in reaching the broad interpretation, were all decided well before Kircher.
Additionally, it is worth pointing out that district court judges are not necessarily bound
by the decisions of their brethren in the same circuit. It is therefore possible that different
2010] 177
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The final circuit in which district courts have expressed an unwavering
enthusiasm for the broad interpretation of SLUSA is the Sixth Circuit.
49
The court in King decided the issue quickly and succinctly: "Both the
legislative history and common sense support the removability of class
actions filed in state court asserting claims exclusively under the 1933
Act.",50 The opinion cited no precedent and gave no reasoning. It also
avoided any consideration of the plain meaning of the statute, by instead
jumping straight to Congress's purpose in passing SLUSA.5 1 In Kulinski v.
American Electric, plaintiffs brought claims under the 1933 Act alleging
misleading and untrue statements by the defendant company in connection
with a dividend reimbursement plan that induced shareholders to buy
additional stock while the company's stock plummeted.52 The Kulinski
court found that the language of the statute and the legislative intent both
supported a broad reading of the removal provision. 3 In so doing, the
court cited heavily to a California federal district court case 54 that has
since been limited and ignored by a series of subsequent district court
cases in the Ninth Circuit.
5
3. Inconsistent Circuits-Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
Plaintiffs filing federal claims in courts in the First and Seventh
Circuits know that their cases will likely end up in state court. Conversely,
plaintiffs filing in courts in the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits can be
fairly certain that their cases will be decided in federal court. The real
danger with having differing interpretations of SLUSA lies in the fact that
in courts in the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, plaintiffs may have little
judges may disagree on the correct interpretation of a statute. However, prior decisions
by different judges in the same circuit would certainly carry some persuasive precedential
or advisory weight.
49. See In re King Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 503 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 6, 2004);
Kulinski v. Am. Elec. Power Co., No. 2-03-412, 2003 WL 24032299 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
19, 2003).
50. In re King Pharmaceuticals, 230 F.R.D. at 505. The court also cited the possibility
of confusion of issues created by having concurrent class actions asserting similar claims
in both state and federal court. Id.
51. Id.; see infra Part II.B for a discussion of Congress's intent.
52. Kulinski, 2003 WL 24032299, at *1.
53. Id. at *14.
54. Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
55. See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
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or no idea where their claims will ultimately be decided; those circuits, at
various times, have embraced both the narrow and broad interpretations.
In the Second Circuit, the District Court for the Eastern District of
New York reached opposite conclusions in the span of seven months. 56 In
Irra v. Lazard, with the now Chief Judge Dearie writing the opinion, the
court found that state courts should handle a claim by plaintiffs that
alleged the defendant offered misleading statements in the course of a
public offering under Section 11 of the 1933 Act.57 The decision relied
heavily on the fact that the "Second Circuit has interpreted almost
identical language" in other cases. 58 The Irra court concluded, with no
other explanation, that because "[p]laintiffs' claims are based solely on the
Securities Act," they are not removable under SLUSA.59 In the later case
of Rubin v. Pixelplus, with the then Chief Judge Koram authoring the
opinion, the court reached the opposite conclusion in a similar situation
involving claims arising solely under the 1933 Act.60 In finding that the
case should be removable, the court considered both the statutory
language and the legislative intent of SLUSA and arrived at what it
considered a "reasonable construction." 61 In doing so, the Rubin court
avoided mentioning its previous decision in Irra.
The Fifth Circuit is another circuit where district courts have reversed
their interpretation of SLUSA within the course of a year.62 The decision
in Waste Management was the first time a court in the Fifth Circuit dealt
with the removability issue under SLUSA.63 After looking extensively at
the statutory language and the purpose of Congress in passing the
56. Compare Irra v. Lazard Ltd., No. 05-3388, 2006 WL 2375472 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15,
2006) (holding that, under the "Second Circuit's interpretation of the Securities Act as
modified by SLUSA," only state law claims are removable), with Rubin v. Pixelplus Co.,
No. 06-2964, 2007 WL 778485 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (holding that SLUSA rendered
all Securities Act claims removable).
57. Irra, 2006 WL 2375472, at *1.
58. Id. at *1 (citing Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, 395 F.3d 25, 33 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd on
other grounds, 547 U.S. 71 (2006)).
59. Id.
60. Rubin, 2007 WL 778485.
61. Id. at *6. The Rubin court dealt with the Kircher decision at some length and
reached the conclusion that it supported a broad interpretation of the removal statute. This
Note contends that this court's reading of the Supreme Court's decision is incorrect. See
infra Part IV.
62. Compare In re Waste Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D. Tex.
2002), with Alkow v. TXU Corp., Nos. 02-2738-K, 2003 WL 21056750 (N.D. Tex. May
8, 2003).
63. In re Waste Mgmt., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
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amendment to the 1933 Act, the court concluded that "the removal
sections under SLUSA are expressly and precisely drawn and limited.,
64
There was no statutory ambiguity; the court was convinced that Congress
knew exactly what it was doing in passing SLUSA, and meant to allow the
removability of only claims based in state law.65 A year later, in Alkow v.
TXU, the court undertook a "careful reading of the statute" 66 and decided
that the SLUSA amendment would be rendered useless if it were read to
only permit the removal of state law based claims. The court also
expressed a desire to help Congress fulfill its intent in curbing frivolous
lawsuits that frustrated the purpose of SLUSA.68 In adopting a broad
interpretation, the Alkow court did not mention the Waste Management
decision.
The Ninth Circuit, specifically the district court for the Central District
of California, is the final jurisdiction where courts have adopted different
interpretations of the removal provision. 69 In Brody v. Homestore, a case
which dealt with federal claims arising from a kick-back scheme by the
defendant company, the court found that the removal provision should be
construed broadly.7 0 The court looked at Congress's legislative findings
when SLUSA was passed,7' as well as the intent and purpose behind the
amendment. The Brody court avoided an analysis of the statutory
language, except to note that the removal amendment was added to a
section of the 1933 Act that up to that point had allowed for concurrent
64. Id. For the Waste Management court, it might have mattered that they found no
deceptive motive on the part of the plaintiffs: "[T]his Court observes that there is no
allegation, no less any evidence, in this action that Plaintiffs are attempting to
fraudulently plead around SLUSA to avoid removal into state court." Id.
65. Id.
66. Alkow, 2003 WL 21056750, at *1.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *2 ("In short, Congress intended SLUSA to prevent the exact maneuver used
by the Alkows here.").
69. Compare Pipefitters Local 522 & 633 Pension Trust Fund v. Salem Commc'ns
Corp., No. 05-2730-RGK, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14202 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2005), and
Hawaii Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine Corp., No. 03-0714-BTM,
2003 WL 23509312 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2003), with Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F.
Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
70. Brody, 240 F. Supp. 2d, at 1123.
71. The court specifically relied on the fact that "a number of securities class action
lawsuits have shifted from Federal to State courts." Id. at 1124.
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72jurisdiction. The court failed to explain why it found that fact
particularly persuasive.
73
After the Brody decision, the Ninth Circuit district courts began to
shift toward a narrower interpretation. In Hawaii Structural Ironworkers v.
Calpine Corporation, the court acknowledged that statements by members
of Congress may indicate that they intended to have SLUSA apply to all
claims, not just those founded in or brought under state law. 74 However,
the court also found that the language of the statute itself was plain and
clear and adopted the narrow approach, holding: "[W]here the language of
the statute is clear, it is not up to the Court to modify it to effect
Congress's likely intent." 75 Similarly, the court in Pipefitters v. Salem
Communications found that the language of the removal provision was
clear, not subject to competing interpretations, and that a narrow
interpretation would not render the language meaningless. 76 The court
agreed with the reasoning of the Hawaii Structural Ironworkers court that
the inquiry should stop when the language is clear.77 The court remanded
the action back to state court for action in accordance with its
understanding of the narrow interpretation.
There is a general and widespread sense of uncertainty regarding the
proper interpretation of SLUSA's removal provision in light of recent
rulings, particularly those decisions in district courts in the Second, Fifth,
and Ninth Circuits. Courts have demonstrated a tendency to ignore prior
decisions when it suits their needs and have given varying weight and
importance to statutory language and legislative intent. Even then, the
courts have interpreted the facts of SLUSA in various ways. As the law
currently stands, there is a definite split at the district court level across the
country, and the traditional methods of determining how the removal
provision of SLUSA should be interpreted have proved insufficient.
72. Id. at 1123-24.
73. That has not stopped other courts from relying on the Brody decision. See supra
note 54.
74. Hawaii Structural Ironworkers, 2003 WL 23509312, at *2.
75. Id.
76. Pipefitters Local 522 & 633 Pension Trust Fund v. Salem Commc'ns Corp., No.
05-2730-RKG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14202, at *5-7.
77. Id. at *5, 7, 8 ("Legislative history is irrelevant to the interpretation of an
unambiguous statute." (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808
n.3 (1989))).
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II. THE CURRENTLY ACCEPTED INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORKS HAVE
PROVEN INADEQUATE To ANSWER THE SLUSA REMOVAL QUESTION
A. The Plain Meaning of the Statute Is Vague and Open to Interpretation
When interpreting a statute, courts initially look to the plain meaning
of the words that the legislature used when drafting the law. The goal of
the courts is to give meaning to every word of the statute. 79 If the words
can be interpreted to reach an understandable and rational conclusion, the
interpretative inquiry ends there. When the law is plain and clear on its
face, courts have no obligation to change the law to better conform with
Congress's original intent. 80 The courts that have determined that the
meaning of the relevant SLUSA statute is plain and unambiguous have
almost uniformly adopted the narrow interpretation of the removal statute.
The courts that do find SLUSA's language clear spend very little time
in the analysis. They often merely recite the words of the statute followed
by a perfunctory and conclusory summation, as though the meaning of the
statute is so obvious that it needs no more explanation. 8 1 While this
represents the spirit behind the plain meaning framework, simply holding
that "the plain language of the Securities Act, as amended by SLUSA,
clearly and unambiguously permits the removal of only those covered
class action complaints that are based on State statutory or common
law, 82 without offering reasons for that conclusion, strongly suggests a
78. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993); Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("Absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive."). It will become axiomatic that in this case, it is difficult to discern any
clear legislative intention, let alone a contrary legislative intention. See infra Part II.B.
79. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a statute we
are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.").
80. See Hawaii Structural Ironworkers, 2003 WL 23509312, at *2; Robin Kundis
Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why it Matters: Statutory Conversations and a
Cultural Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REv. 955, 1034-39
(2005).
81. See Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL 1888843, at
*3 (N.D. I11. Apr. 16, 2003) (deciding that the plain meaning was applicable after
repeating the statutory language with no explanation); see also Jeffery T. Cook,
Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 621, 624 (2006) ("The heart of the PSLRA ... does
not apply to 1933 Act claims. Nor does SLUSA, which by its plain language applies only
to state law claims.").
82. Nauheim, 2003 WL 1888843, at *3.
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type of judicial pre-determinism. In reading the holdings of courts that
have adopted the narrow interpretation of the removal provision, one often
gets the impression that the court had made up its mind before considering
the applicable statute. Other courts deal only briefly with the complex
statutory construction arguments of those who would prefer a broad
interpretation. 83 This is not to say that the courts reach the wrong result; it
is certainly possible that SLUSA is perfectly clear to them. However, it
also must be acknowledged that the statute is arguably dense and
potentially confusing. Courts that find it to be clear would do well to
explain more thoroughly how they reached their conclusion.
Courts that have held that the language is murky rather than clear and
unambiguous are guilty of the same sin of under-explanation. Their brief
discussions of why the language is not clear are similarly subject to the
criticism that the court has already decided the result of the case and
simply needs a path to the broad interpretation of the removal provision.
In rejecting the plain meaning approach, the main ambiguity that these
courts have pointed to is the language of 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c).84 Defendants
in these removal cases have argued that the the phrase "as set forth in
subsection (b)" should only apply to the term "covered security," and not
"covered class action" as well.85 Such an interpretation would essentially
render both state and federal claims removable. One court has gone a step
further than simply highlighting the ambiguity regarding what phrase "as
set forth in subsection (b)" modifies and has implicitly accepted the broad
interpretation as the plain and clear one.
86
The point of this section is not to weigh in on the merits of either side
of the plain meaning argument. At the very least, it is obvious that the
language of subsections (b) and (c) of 15 U.S.C. § 77p is not as clear as it
83. See Pipefitters Local 522 and 633 Pension Trust Fund v. Salem Commc'ns Corp.,
No. 05-2730-RGK, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14202, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (summarily
dismissing defendant's nuanced and complex arguments in two paragraphs).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000) ("Any covered class action brought in any State court
involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b) shall be removable to the
Federal district court for the district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject to
subsection (b)") (emphasis added).
85. See Unschuld v. Tri-S Sec. Corp., No. 06-02931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at
*14 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007) (rejecting defendant's contention in a well-reasoned
opinion that stretches beyond the bounds of this Note).
86. See Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(finding somewhat contradictorily that the language of SLUSA was clear enough to
support defendant's interpretation while at the same time indicating that the statute is
"inartfully [sic] (or even inaccurately) worded").
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could be. Because the removal provision suffers from this deficiency, the
plain meaning doctrine is certainly not the ideal framework for courts to
determine the scope of removal. A more concrete method that does not
suggest that a court is trying to rationalize a result would give either side
more credibility.
It should be noted that, in some judicial circles, the plain meaning
doctrine is losing favor, or at least its long assumed primacy in statutory
interpretation. 8" For example, in State v. Courchesne,88 a case that dealt
with the correct interpretation of a statute providing for aggravating
factors in criminal prosecutions of multiple murders, 89 the Connecticut
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the plain meaning doctrine of statutory
interpretation in favor of an approach that combined the language of the
statute with the court's analysis of the judicial intent.90 The court held that
because of the plain meaning rule's potentially inconsistent nature when
faced with poorly drafted statutes, it is not "a useful rubric for the process
of statutory interpretation." 91 The court also found that the plain meaning
rule can be self-contradictory when the plain meaning of words leads to
ridiculous or unworkable results, and that it requires courts to make a
difficult threshold determination of ambiguousness.92 The Courchesne
Court seemed puzzled by the general acceptance of the plain meaning
87. See Wilson v. State, 127 P.3d 826, 829 (Alaska 2006) ("We interpret a statute
according to reason, practicality, and common sense, considering the meaning of its
language, its legislative history, and its purpose."); Carpenteri-Waddington, Inc. v.
Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 650 A.2d 147, 151 (Conn. 1994) ("No one invariable rule of
statutory construction is controlling."); Lauer v. Zoning Comm'n, 600 A.2d 310, 312-13
(Conn. 1991) (citing the words of the statute, the legislative history and policy, and the
circumstances surrounding the enactment as relevant factors in statutory interpretation);
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806-11 (1983) (criticizing canons of statutory interpretation
generally, and the plain meaning rule specifically); Matthew J. Hertko, Note, Statutory
Interpretation in Illinois: Abandoning the Plain Meaning Rule for an Extratextual
Approach, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 377.
88. State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562 (Conn. 2003).
89. Id. at 568. Specifically, the court found that for "especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved" aggravating factors to apply against a criminal defendant convicted of multiple
murders, "it is not necessary under that statutory scheme that the defendant in the present
case intentionally, or callously or indifferently, inflicted extreme pain, suffering or torture
on both of his victims, so long as he is shown to have done so with respect to one of his
victims." Id.
90. Id. at 582.
91. Id. at 582-83.
92. Id.
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doctrine, finding that the constitutionally required separation of powers
does not compel or demand a certain method of statutory analysis that
ignores legislative intent, and that courts should be free to employ a
"purposive and contextual method of interpreting statutes." 93
In response to the Courchesne decision, the Connecticut State
Legislature took the highly unusual-and potentially unconstitutional 9 4 -
step of dismissing the reasoning of the Connecticut Supreme Court and
codifying court standards for statutory interpretation. 95 The Legislature
essentially mandated the plain meaning rule in dictating that courts should
first attempt to ascertain the meaning of the statute from the words used
and the meaning of the surrounding statutes. 96 Subsequently, "if after
examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of
such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or
unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute
shall not be considered.' '97 In addition to directing courts how to do their
jobs, the Legislature has put the court system at the mercy of poorly
drafted statutes. In Connecticut, the possibility now exists that a statute
may only be legally subject to one interpretation, despite a clearly contrary
intention by the Legislature. In that situation, reviewing courts would not
be permitted to adopt a contrary interpretation. 98 As of the end of their last
term, the Connecticut Supreme Court has declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the Legislature's apparent intrusion into the realm of
separation of powers.
This Note does not pretend that the plain meaning doctrine is on its
death bed, a few decisions away from obsoleteness. It is almost certain
that courts will continue to accept the doctrine. This section is merely
93. Id. at 588 ("The [Connecticut] constitution says nothing about what type of
language the legislature must employ in performing its tasks, and nothing about what
method or methods the judiciary must employ in ascertaining the meaning of that
language.").
94. It appears that the Connecticut Legislature is clearly stepping on, and possibly
over, the boundary between the legislative and judicial branches by mandating how
courts should approach statutory interpretation. It would seem to be an issue ripe for
academic study and comment.
95. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2z (West 2009).
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. In a strange and arguably counterproductive move, the Legislature has essentially
removed its own safety net. Drafters of statutes now only have one opportunity to get the
language correct; courts will no longer correct the Legislature's careless drafting
mistakes.
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intended to illustrate that at least some courts and commentators believe
that a thorough and comprehensive approach-one that strives for
accuracy in statutory interpretation-involves more than just examining
the arguably straightforward meaning of the words the relevant legislature
used. Certainly in considering the proper interpretation of SLUSA, the
plain meaning doctrine has proven to be an imperfect and malleable
instrument.
B. The Legislative History of the Statute Is Unclear
When statutory language is open to more than one reasonable
interpretation, courts attempt to find the meaning "which can most fairly
be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most
harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress
manifested." 99 Courts are supposed to divine what Congress really meant
from the compilation of transcripts of congressional hearings, debates, and
floor speeches, in addition to the codified legislative findings.
It should be noted from the outset that this method of statutory
interpretation is inherently problematic. Judge Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge
of the Ninth Circuit, has commented that "consulting legislative history is
like 'looking over a crowd of people and picking out your friends."
' 00
Such an acknowledgement of the limitations of looking to legislative
history should give courts pause before using it as the determinative factor
in divining statutory meaning. Courts on both sides of the removal issue
selectively use legislative history to reinforce their conclusions. 10' There
are sections of the legislative history of SLUSA pertaining to the removal
of state and federal law claims to federal court that supposedly support
both the broad and narrow interpretations; as such, looking to that history
is another unsatisfactory way of attempting to correctly interpret the
statute. The failure of legislative history to yield conclusive results
99. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil
Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
100. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History be an Impeachable Offense?,
31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 807, 813 (1998). Judge Kozinksi was quoting Judge Harold
Leventhal, who served on the District of Columbia Circuit from 1965-1979. See GREAT
AMERICAN JUDGES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 457-62 (John R. Vile ed., 2003).
101. These excerpts seem to be used to justify and rationalize the holding, as opposed
to being used to actually understand the statute. Courts use legislative history in the same
way they use the plain meaning doctrine-selectively and without important context. See
supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
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reinforces the need for a concrete and authoritative interpretation of
SLUSA. 1
02
Courts that favor a narrow interpretation of the removal provision
point to the first sentence of SLUSA as conclusive proof that Congress
intended to allow cases arising under federal law to be litigated in state
courts. The sentence indicates that the Act's purpose is "to limit the
conduct of securities class actions under State law. 10 3 Using that
language, courts have found that a narrow interpretation of the statutory
provision does just that; it forbids the use of state law in state court, while
still allowing the use of federal securities law in state court. 1
04
Courts also find supportive language for the narrow interpretation of
the removal provision in SLUSA's conference reports. Specifically, some
courts have endorsed the statement that the purpose of SLUSA was to stop
plaintiffs from attempting to "evade the protections that federal law
provides against abusive litigation by filing suit in State court, rather than
Federal Court."'10 5 By narrowly construing removal, courts can close the
statutory loophole by forbidding plaintiffs from basing a claim in state
law; in so doing, they obey the mandate that the proper arena for certain
cases will be in the federal system, while allowing other claims based on
federal law to remain in the state court where plaintiffs originally filed.'0 6
Many courts that have adopted the narrow interpretation have not
given sufficiently complete opinions on what the legislative history
contains. Having found the language of the statute unambiguous, they
often view such an inquiry as superfluous. 10 7 Other courts that interpret
SLUSA narrowly deal with the legislative history cursorily, finding that
although certain statements or documents may suggest one interpretation
or another, the legislative history, taken in its entirety, is too cloudy to
102. Thankfully, the Supreme Court has seen fit to comment on the interpretative
morass in a way that some courts, and this Note, contend is conclusive. See infra Part III.
103. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998) (emphasis added).
104. See Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of Cos, Inc., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL
1888843, at *5 (N.D. I11. Apr. 16, 2003); Unschuld v. Tri-S Security Corp., No. 06-
02931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at *26 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007).
105. H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
106. See Nauheim, 2003 WL 1888843, at *5; see also Unschuld, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68513, at *27. However, the logic of the reasoning that the narrow interpretation
accomplishes the goal of the abovementioned statement seems tenuous at best.
107. See Patenaude v. Equitable Life, 290 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
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interpret. 18 As the legislative history is "murky insofar as it suggests an
answer to the question before the Court,"'10 9 courts favoring a narrow
interpretation have found that it lacks enough probative force to be reliable
or dispositive.
Courts favoring a broad interpretation of the removal provision
obviously think differently. In their view, certain excerpts of the
legislative history prove conclusively that Congress meant to remove all
securities claims from State court, and simply fell victim to sloppy or
misleading drafting. 110 This argument begins with the congressional
findings of SLUSA, which state that PSLRA tried to prevent abuse in
private securities fraud litigation. Courts favoring this approach next argue
that since PSLRA's enactment, the increasing number of plaintiffs filing
in state court has prevented PSLRA from achieving its objectives.
Congress therefore intended SLUSA to counter that shift."' Allowing any
securities claims to remain in state court would enable plaintiffs to do an
end-around PSLRA. 112 Therefore, the correct objective of SLUSA was to
make "[f]ederal courts the exclusive venue for most securities class action
lawsuits.,, 
13
Another potentially persuasive piece of legislative history that broad
interpretation courts have deemed important is a statement in the
Congressional Record from Representative Thomas Bliley, a Republican
from Virginia. In support of SLUSA's passage, Representative Bliley said:
"The premise of this legislation is simple: lawsuits alleging violations that
involve securities that are offered nationally belong to Federal court."1 1
4
Some courts have cited this quote with approval, finding that it assists in
clearing up the statutory jumble." 5 Still, the wisdom of relying on the
108. See Pipefitters Local 522 & 633 Pension Trust Fund v. Salem Comm. Corp., No.
CV 05-2730-RGK, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14202, at *8 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ("While some
pieces of SLUSA's legislative history might, standing alone, show a desire by Congress
to move many security class action claims to federal court, when taken as a whole the
legislative history does not show a 'clearly contrary congressional intent."').
109. Unschuld, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at *27.
110. See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
111. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2,
112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
112. H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 10 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (citing the "substitution effect"
created when plaintiffs flee from federal court).
113. H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.); see Rovner v. Vonage
Holdings Corp., No. 07-178 (FLW), 2007 WL 446658, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2007).
114. 144 CONG. REC. H11019-01, H11020 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Bliley).
115. See Brody v. Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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statement of one out of five hundred and thirty five members of Congress
recalls the cautioning words of Judge Kozinski. 11
6
With such confusion over the proper interpretation of the words of the
removal statute, as well as the lack of clarity regarding Congress's intent
in drafting the language, any decision that relies solely on these factors
would seem to lack legitimacy. Courts can twist the facts surrounding
SLUSA to support either the narrow or broad interpretation. Until
recently, the ground had been tread so many times that there was "nothing
very original left to say about [the] ... running dispute."'"17 That was the
situation until 2006, when the Supreme Court handed down a
"tiebreak[ing]" 118 ruling that should have provided an appropriate
framework in which to analyze the removal question and eliminated any
further need to use plain meaning or legislative intent.
III. THE TIEBREAKER: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN KIRCHER
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust was a case involving a remand by a
district court of a class action securities claim based in state law. 119 The
main issue in the case was whether the Seventh Circuit had the jurisdiction
to review the district court's decision to remand a claim back to state court
based on the district court's apparent lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 20
This question-whether a federal or state court has the power to review a
remand decision-is another problem caused by the inarticulateness of
SLUSA.
12 1
In Kircher, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs were "injured
as 'holders' of mutual fund shares, not [as] purchasers or sellers.'2 As
116. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. In this case, the crowd that one is
peering out over is the Congress. Citing to one "friend" at the expense of all others seems
to be an exercise of questionable validity. It is not unreasonable to be skeptical of the
gloss that any representative puts on a bill. It is equally likely that another representative
has an equally persuasive, yet substantively different, interpretation. Selectively omitting
all Congressional evidence but that which agrees with a particular position gives that
position an air of illegitimacy.
117. Unschuld v. Tri-S Security Corp., No. 06-02931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at
*4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007).
118. Id. at *31.
119. Id.; see Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, No. 03-CV-0691-DRH, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10327 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2004).
120. Id. at *31-32.
121. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
122. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 638 (2006).
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holders, the district court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the
section of SLUSA that allows for the removal of claims that arise "in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security,' 23 and the
court, therefore, remanded the case back to state court. 24 The Seventh
Circuit reversed and ruled for the defendant trust fund, allowing the
removal of the claim. 1
25
Subsequent to these rulings, and just three months before its decision
in Kircher, the Supreme Court tackled the exact question of what "in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security" actually
means. 126 In Dabit, the Court found that holders of mutual fund shares are
included in subsection (b)'s list of precluded, removeable claims. 127 The
ultimate Kircher ruling was therefore procedural, not substantive, when it
held that under federal law, 128 the case should never have been heard on
appeal at the federal level. 129 In Kircher, the Court did express optimism
that the state courts would read Dabit on remand and decide the case
accordingly. 1
3 0
In holding that the Seventh Circuit overstepped its jurisdiction in
hearing the appeal from the district court,'3 1 the "majority opinion [in
Kircher] went further and ... [i]n doing so ... made a pronouncement that,
albeit dictum, purported to set a standard that would dictate the result in
this case."1 32 After the ultimate issue of the case had been decided, Justice
Souter elaborated on the scope of SLUSA and removal generally.
133
Although the pertinent part of the ruling with regard to this Note's
removal issue is admittedly dictum, several different courts that have
considered the issue in light of Kircher have found that the narrow
interpretation of the removal provision is the correct one. 
134
123. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
124. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 638.
125. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2005).
126. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
127. Id.; Kircher, 547 U.S. at 638 n.5.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000) (stating that an "order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise").
129. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 640-45.
130. Id. at 635.
131. Id. at 639.
132. Unschuld v. Tri-S Security Corp., No. 06-02931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at
*32 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007).
133. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 646.
134. See id.; Layne v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 08-3262 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2008)
(order granting motion to remand).
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Specifically, the Kircher Court held that, when deciding which claims
are removable under subsection (c), 135 there is "no reason to reject the
straightforward reading: removal and jurisdiction to deal with removed
cases is limited to those precluded by the terms of subsection (b).,' 3 6 As
has been discussed, one of the applicable parts of subsection (b) refers to
any "covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any
State."'37 This tracks with the reasoning of the district court in Kircher.
Although the district court was incorrect in determining that holders were
not precluded and not removeable,' 38 the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the lower court was correct to say that the failure of a claim to
conform to any part of subsection (b), not just that part dealing with
covered securities, can be grounds for a court to deny removal.
It is noteworthy that the Kircher Court referred to removed cases and
subsection (b) in the same breath. Courts favoring the broad interpretation
have argued that the subsection (b) limitation applies only to covered
securities, not covered class actions.1 39 By including the two terms
together, the Court suggested that the limitation on removal in subsection
(c) should apply to particular class actions, not simply to particular
covered securities.
The Kircher Court continued by explaining that "if the action is not
precluded [under subsection (b)], the federal court likewise has no
jurisdiction to touch the case on the merits, and the proper course is to
remand to the state court that can deal with it."140 In other words, an action
will only be precluded from the concurrent jurisdiction of the 1933 Act,
and can only be removed, if the action meets all of the required elements
of subsection (b).14 1 If a claim is not precluded, perhaps because the claim
does not implicate state or common law, or because the incorrect kind of
covered security is alleged, the Court recommended labeling the claim as
unremovable and sending the claim back to state court. It is through this
mechanism that the concurrent jurisdiction of the 1933 Act is preserved
for federally based claims.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2000).
136. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 643 (emphasis added).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
138. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 638 n.5.
139. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
140. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 644.
141. See infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text for an explanation of why all, not
just some, of the provisions of subsection (b) must be met for issue preclusion and
removability.
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The logic of Kircher regarding the effect that a subsection (b) covered
security provision can have on removability can be directly applied to the
question at issue in this Note. While Kircher dealt with one specific phrase
of SLUSA, 142 the broad versus narrow question deals with a different
phrase in the same statutory section. 143 However, an internally consistent
interpretation of SLUSA can only be achieved by giving the state law
provision as much power as the covered security provision. To read the
statute as allowing only the covered security provision to prohibit
removal, particularly given the lack of statutory language stating that one
provision or clause in that subsection should be given more weight than
another provision, would render the introductory language in subsection
(b) useless.
By ruling that subsection (b)(1) can prohibit removal, the Kircher
Court seemed explicitly to say that if a claim fails to meet any one of the
requirements of subsection (b),144 removal is not an option. Therefore, if a
claim is brought that is not based upon the statutory or common law of a
state, the proper action for the federal courts is to remand the claim back
to the state level. It follows, then, that a claim based in federal law, which
is not precluded by the state or common law language in subsection (b),
should be entertained at the state level. 1
45
IV. THE SUBSEQUENT DISTRICT COURT REACTION-
SOME SEMBLANCE OF UNIFORMITY?
A. Kircher as an Endorsement of the Narrow Interpretation
After the 2006 Kircher decision, several courts faced the narrow
versus broad interpretative question. The courts that identified Kircher as
142. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1) (2000) ("[I]n connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security.").
143. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000) ("[B]ased upon the statutory or common law of any
State.").
144. For example, not asserting: (1) an untrue statement or omission of material fact,
(2) a statement in connection with the purchase of a covered security, (3) a manipulative
or deceptive device, or (4) a claim based in state or common law. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)
(2000).
145. The Supreme Court appears to implicitly embrace the plain meaning argument
discussed supra Part II.A, insofar as it finds the statute self-explanatory on its face. In
determining what actions should properly be precluded, the Court makes no reference to
legislative history or legislative intent. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 643-44.
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a forceful statement by the Supreme Court adopted the narrow
interpretation.
While recognizing that the Kircher decision did not perform the long
and complex textual analysis that other courts have used to analyze the
removal provision, the Unschuld court still viewed it as a "rather emphatic
and expansive statement."' 146 The Unschuld decision assumes, without
explanation, that "[p]resumably, the Court was aware of the ongoing
dispute about the removal of such claims.' 47 Though that claim may
initially seem flimsy, it is reasonable to think that the Court decided to kill
two SLUSA birds with one stone by answering the remand question 148 and
the question over exactly what claims are covered by the removal
provision at the same time. Given the mass confusion that the removal
provision has caused at the district court level, 149 it is reasonable to believe
that the Court was at least aware of the problem and willing to give their
definitive interpretation.
Perhaps the strongest indication that Kircher endorses the narrow
interpretation of the removal provision as the correct interpretation is the
fact that courts are relying on it in their removal analysis. In addition to
the Unschuld court, which found Kircher to be the factor that broke the
deadlock between plain meaning and legislative history, 150 a recent
decision by a district court in the Central District of California overruled
that same court's 2005 adoption of the broad interpretation. 151 The court in
Layne v. Countrywide Financial found "highly persuasive the reasoning
employed by the Unschuld court, which considers in depth ... the case
law, including the recent Supreme Court decision," and found that the
SLUSA provision should be interpreted narrowly.' 52 The court also
recognized that "its 2005 Purowitz153 decision reaches the contrary
result."' 154 In deciding that the narrow interpretation was correct, the Layne
court used "a number of more recent authorities that inform the analysis
146. Unschuld v. Tri-S Security Corp., No. 06-02931, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at
*34 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2007).
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 119-21.
149. See supra notes 31-77 and accompanying text.
150. Unschuld, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68513, at *31.
151. Layne v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 08-3262, slip. op. (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2008).
152. Id.
153. Purowitz v. DreamWorks Animation SKG, Inc., No. 05-6090, slip. op. (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 15, 2005).
154. Layne, No. 08-3262, n.1.
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and prompt the conclusion that remand is now appropriate."' 155 Clearly, the
Kircher opinion was the factor that so quickly changed this court's mind.
B. Some Lower Courts' Subsequent Failure to Conform to Kircher
Although it seems clear that the Supreme Court has decided the issue
once and for all, several courts appear hesitant to change their position.
Even after Kircher, the District Court of New Jersey, in Pinto156 and
Rovner,157 avoided any discussion of the Supreme Court's directed
message. Neither case mentioned Kircher in coming to the conclusion that
the broad interpretation was correct. 158 In light of the Kircher Court going
out of its way to address the issue, it appears that these courts, in failing to
even mention Kircher, missed or ignored the new interpretation.
One post-Kircher court that mentioned the Supreme Court's decision
used a different excerpt from Kircher to embrace the broad
interpretation. 159 Specifically, the Rubin court found this passage in
Kircher to be persuasive: "Section 77p(c)'s authorization for the removal
... is confined to cases 'set forth in subsection (b),' i.e. those with claims
of untruth, manipulation."'' 60 To conclude that this section mandates a
broad interpretation of the removal provision by including both federal
and state law claims is to engage in a tortured and misleading word game.
There is no dispute that removable claims must assert some level of
untruth or manipulation. 161 However, for the Rubin court to conclude that
this mere recitation of some of the requirements for removal supports the
broad interpretation is deceptive. It ignores the elements listed in the
introduction of subsection (b), elements of the claim that must be fulfilled
before even looking to the subparts of subsection (b) to see what the claim
155. Id.
156. Pinto v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-0062, 2007 WL 1381746 (D.N.J. May 7,
2007).
157. Rovner v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 07-178, 2007 WL 446658 (D.N.J. Feb. 7,
2007).
158. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
159. Rubin v. Pixelplus Co., Ltd., No. 06-2964, 2007 WL 778485, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 13, 2007).
160. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 634 (2006).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1)-(2) (2000) (stating that any removable claims must allege
"an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security" or "that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security") (emphasis added).
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specifically asserts. It ignores the familiar part of the statute that requires
that the claim implicate a "statutory or common law of any State"' 6 that
asserts untruths or manipulation. Simply stating that a claim asserts
untruths or manipulation only satisfies one half of the subsection (b) test.
Additionally, the Kircher fragment the Rubin court cited does not
specify federal and/or state law claims, but only speaks of ambiguous
"cases...with claims of untruth, manipulation, and so on." 163 The Rubin
court would have a more persuasive argument if Kircher had referred to
cases asserting either state or federal law. Barring this, the passage Rubin
cites is too ambiguous to draw any conclusions from, and is certainly less
helpful than the straightforward, clear section adopting the narrow
interpretation. 164 The Rubin decision and any of its progeny, therefore,
misconstrue the statute and the Supreme Court's reading of it in a
desperate attempt to keep the broad interpretation of removal jurisdiction
alive. The Kircher decision should properly be understood to "not confer
removal jurisdiction under this scenario [where solely federal claims are
filed in state court].' 65
One additional post-Kircher court that has tackled the removal issue
adopted an interpretation that is as clever as it is improbable. In Knox v.
Agria Corporation,166 a court in the Southern District of New York
indicated that the broad interpretation was the correct way to understand
SLUSA. 167 However, the Knox court avoided basing its ruling on either
plain meaning or statutory interpretation. Instead, it focused on SLUSA
"differently from other courts"' 68 and held that it was not a "court of
competent jurisdiction,' 169 and had no subject matter jurisdiction over the
removability of 1933 Act claims.1 70 The Knox court arrived at this
conclusion by going beyond the explicit limits of the removal text and
without citing any decision from any other court for support.' 7 ' The Knox
court went on to state that mention of covered class actions in subsection
162. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000).
163. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 642.
164. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
165. See Layne v. Cantrywide Fin. Corp., No. 08-3268, slip. op. (C.D. Cal. July 7,
2008). For a discussion of the Layne decision see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
166. Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
167. Id. at 422.
168. Id. at 423. Indeed, such an approach is completely unique to the removal question.
169. See 15. U.S.C. § 77v (a) (2000).
170. Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
171. In fact, Knox claims that all the other courts "overlooked" this argument. Id. at
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(C)172 does not implicate subsection (b) at all; it is merely a term of art that
can be defined more accurately in the definition section. 73 Knox went
further to claim that the reference to subsection (b) "has no substantive
content."' 174 Again, the opinion cites no authority for the proposition that
the drafters of the statute meant for the caveat in subsection (c) to have no
effect.
The reasoning of the Knox court, in addition to lacking citation to any
prior authority, is also belied by the court's apparent acceptance of the
conclusion that the broad interpretation is the correct one. Before delving
into its reasoning, the court bluntly states that the narrow interpretation
"does not make sense."'175 The decision also declares that "this Court's
reading is consistent with Congress's general remedial intent in passing
SLUSA."' 76 This suggests that the court was determined to adopt the
broad interpretation in any way possible, even if it had to create a new and
intellectually suspect interpretative approach.
The Knox court addresses Kircher in one paragraph before summarily
dismissing it as inapplicable and "not to the contrary."' 177 As Kircher dealt
with the removal of covered class actions raising state law claims, not
1933 Act claims, Knox reasoned that nothing the Court said would impact
their decision in this case involving federal claims. That Knox relied on
the fact that the Kircher court did not have to explicitly decide the federal
law removal question in its decision indicates that the Knox court
misunderstood the meaning of dicta. Simply because the Kircher decision
did not hinge on the issue at hand does not mean that there are not lessons
for other courts to learn regarding SLUSA interpretation. Dicta are
statements made in a decision that are not determinative in the outcome,
but are nonetheless important to the deciding court. Reliance by other
courts178 on Kircher's dicta indicate that it is due more respect than theKnox court's cursory dismissal.
172. 15 U.S.C. 77p(c) (2006) ("Any covered class action brought in any State court
involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b).").
173. Knox, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 423-24.
174. Id. at 424.
175. Id. at 423.
176. Id. at 425.
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
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C. Did the Supreme Court Get Kircher Wrong?
One scholarly article has attempted to claim that the Supreme Court
made a mistake in Kircher, and, despite the Court's language, the Court
meant to adopt the broad interpretation.' 79 William Snyder concedes that
"language in Kircher suggests that the Court would adopt the narrow
reading of SLUSA's removal provision in the context of federal claims
brought under the Securities Act," 180 but he maintains that the Court's
decision in Merrill Lynch v. Dabit18 1 indicates the Court's true intentions.
After noting that the Supreme Court has apparently provided conflicting
guidance' 82 with regards to SLUSA removal, Snyder again delves into the
problematic legislative history to discern which specific claims the statute
addresses. 183 While Snyder makes many of the same arguments regarding
the legislative history as those courts that have adopted the broad
interpretation, 184 he fails to give due deference to the fact that Kircher was
decided almost three months after Dabit.185 Presumably, any mistakes that
the Court made in their Dabit -decision could have been rectified by
Kircher. It seems odd to assert that Kircher is the decision that was
incorrect, especially considering that Dabit was likely fresh in the Court's
mind when it considered Kircher.
Snyder's argument fails for another reason: the section of Dabit that he
views as decisive in signaling an acceptance of the broad interpretation
does not do so. The Dabit court was asked to decide the proper meaning of
"in connection with the purchase or sale."'' 86 The Court held that the
phrase should be interpreted broadly and expansively.' 87 From that,
Snyder argues that all of subsection (b), not just the applicable subpart,
should be interpreted expansively.' Regardless of the fact that inter-
preting state and common law claims "expansively" to include federal
claims would strain the bounds of credulity, making a mockery of both
common sense and the statute, Snyder fails to mention that Dabit made
clear that its expansive and broad interpretation applied specifically to the
179. See Snyder, supra note 11.
180. Id. at 692.
181. Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
182. Snyder, supra note 11, at 690-93.
183. Id. at 693-97.
184. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
185. Dabit was decided on March 21, 2006, Kircher was decided on June 15, 2006.
186. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 74; see supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
187. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85.
188. Snyder, supra note 11, at 690-91.
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one phrase in question. 189 Unlike Kircher, Dabit did not make broad or
sweeping claims about SLUSA that were outside the scope of the issue
presented. It seems clear that Kircher's pronouncement about the totality
of subsection (b) trumps anything that Dabit said about a specific section
not at issue here. While Snyder may wish to argue that a broad
interpretation of all SLUSA should be the rule, it is clear from Kircher
that, until Congress decides to amend the removal provision, the narrow
interpretation of SLUSA is the rule.
Despite Kircher's persuasive dicta, progress toward a uniform
understanding of removal under SLUSA still appears elusive. Though
several courts have adopted the narrow interpretation post-Kircher, other
courts and commentators appear reluctant to change, and instead cling to
inadequate interpretative tools or insufficient and incomplete arguments.
Although the law is not as settled as it should be post-Kircher, courts that
go into a removal question with an open mind and without preconceived
notions should recognize the importance of the Kircher dicta and follow
the lead of the Unschuld and Layne courts in embracing the narrow
interpretation.
CONCLUSION
How courts interpret a statutory provision governing the removal of a
claim alleging securities violations may initially seem like a minor
problem. To those plaintiffs filing in state courts, however, it has a
tremendous impact on how their case will progress. It becomes even more
consequential when one considers the large amount of interpretative chaos
that one small provision has caused. 190 It is not the goal of this Note to
speculate normatively on what the law should be, or about the various
policy considerations that go into such a decision, or about the benefits of
strictly regulating class action lawsuits. Rather, this Note is designed to
remove any confusion about what the law is after Kircher, as well as to
question the usefulness of both the plain meaning doctrine and the use of
legislative history and intent when it comes to examining the removal
provision.
The two interpretative frameworks that the courts dealing with SLUSA
have used are both woefully inadequate methods of achieving the correct
189. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85 ("Congress can hardly have been unaware of the broad
construction adopted by both this Court and the SEC when it imported the key phrase-
'in connection with the purchase or sale'-into SLUSA's core provision.").
190. See supra Part I.
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result.191 Plain meaning and legislative intent, when applied to SLUSA
interpretation, are mere empty vessels that can be filled with facts that a
court finds appropriate to justify its conclusion. In dealing with the
removal provision, these methods embody post hoc reasoning that is more
concerned with achieving the desired result then getting to the truth of the
law. It is difficult to imagine another reason for the gross disparity of
removal decisions at the federal district court level.
Presumably recognizing the difficulty the lower courts have had
setting aside their beliefs about the law long enough to interpret it fairly,
the Supreme Court responded in a way that answers the removal question
for good. 192 By stating in fairly clear and unambiguous terms that only
claims filed under state law at the state level are removable because all of
subsection (b) should be considered, the Court endorsed the narrow
interpretation of SLUSA. That other courts have relied on the Court's
reasoning, even to the point of overturning recent contrary decisions, is
further proof that the Court's decision should be treated as final.193 The
fact that other courts have ignored Kircher does not make it less
relevant-it merely makes those courts mistaken. Commentators who
believe that all securities claims filed in state law should be removable
improperly disregard the importance of Kircher in their attempt to dictate
what the law should be. As it stands after Kircher, SLUSA only allows the
removal from state court of claims based in state law, not federal law.
J. Tyler Butts*
191. See supra Parts II.A, ll.B.
192. See supra Part III.
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